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Abstract In spite of the benefits of biometric-based authentication systems, there
are few concerns raised because of the sensitivity of biometric data to outliers, low
performance caused due to intra-class variations and privacy invasion caused by in-
formation leakage. To address these issues, we propose a hybrid fusion framework
where only the protected modalities are combined to fulfill the requirement of secrecy
and performance improvement. This paper presents a method to integrate cance-
lable modalities utilizing mean-closure weighting (MCW) score level and Dempster-
Shafer (DS) theory based decision level fusion for iris and fingerprint to mitigate
the limitations in the individual score or decision fusion mechanisms. The proposed
hybrid fusion scheme incorporates the similarity scores from different matchers cor-
responding to each protected modality. The individual scores obtained from different
matchers for each modality are combined using MCW score fusion method. The
MCW technique achieves the optimal weight for each matcher involved in the score
computation. Further, DS theory is applied to the induced scores to output the final
decision. The rigorous experimental evaluations on three virtual databases indicate
that the proposed hybrid fusion framework outperforms over the component level
or individual fusion methods (score level and decision level fusion). As a result, we
achieve (48%,66%), (72%,86%) and (49%,38%) of performance improvement over
unimodal cancelable iris and unimodal cancelable fingerprint verification systems
for Virtual A, Virtual B and Virtual C databases, respectively. Also, the proposed
method is robust enough to the variability of scores and outliers satisfying the re-
quirement of secure authentication.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decade, reliable and accurate biometric-based authentication is the ut-
most need for numerous applications such as access control, banking, and healthcare
[19]. Despite several benefits, there are various privacy and performance issues exist
such as noisy data, sensitivity to outliers, lack of uniqueness, identity invasion and ab-
sence of revocability in unimodal biometric systems [30]. In this regard, security and
performance are the two key parameters for recognition systems. As a result, there is
a need for a biometric system which can achieve template protection as well as per-
formance improvement to yield robustness to the system [3]. For protecting original
biometric template, the idea of cancelable biometric is introduced with three require-
ments: non-invertibility, diversity and revocability [24]. Non-invertibility states that
the original biometric template should not be recovered from the protected one. Di-
versity refers to derive numerous templates from the same original template whereas
revocability denotes that a new template must be issued if a stored protected tem-
plate gets compromised. These three criteria must be satisfied to ensure the privacy
of any user and to prevent any possibility of security theft [3, 16]. To improve the
performance, biometric fusion [30] is adopted in recent years which combines the
information from more than one biometric modality. Therefore, we focus on multi-
biometric fusion to ascertain improvement in the performance and utilize cancelable
biometric to assure privacy protection to alleviate the aforementioned limitations.
There exist five different level of fusion i.e. sensor, feature, rank, score, and deci-
sion. Most of the feature level multimodal protection approaches [27, 3, 26, 29, 39, 5]
involve concatenation, random projection or transformation based on a user-specific
PIN for privacy protection. The approaches proposed in [27, 3, 26, 29, 39, 5] lead to a
minor performance improvement over the unimodal biometric system. Moreover, if a
protected multi-biometric template gets compromised, there is no possibility to pre-
vent the loss of original biometric information. The existing works in [2, 35] choose
fingerprint as a biometric modality and incorporate feature-level fusion. Hence, there
is no mode present to re-transform it with a new key if multi-biometric template
gets compromised. Though the methods proposed in [6, 36] shows a significant per-
formance improvement, they are too complex for real-world implications. Besides
feature level, there have been various methods [22, 15, 18, 9, 25] incorporating score
fusion in recent years. Mezai et al. [22] applied score fusion over face and voice bio-
metric using DS theory. The method proposed by Mezai et al. [22] performs poor in
verification scenario. Recently, Kabir et al. [15] proposed confidence-based weight-
ing (CBW) for score fusion after normalization. This weighting scheme does not
utilize the complete set of scores which aids to uncertainty. Kumar et al. [18] applied
Ant Colony Optimization (ACO) to evaluate weights in sum-rule based score fusion.
The limitation lies in the complex implementation and it may also suffer from the
local minimum problem. Sadhya et al. [31] utilized Bayesian decision theory to com-
bine soft biometric traits. In this method [31], the performance degrades if matcher’s
characteristics or distributions are not known. Nguyen et al. [25] proposed DS theory
based score fusion for iris and fingerprint. The method provides an incorrect decision
in scenarios where sufficient training samples are absent.
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Among the five different fusion levels, score level fusion is favored owing to
the factors such as ease of fusion and freedom to choose any feature extraction and
matching algorithms [14]. Despite many benefits, many commercial firms provide
access only on the basis of the final decision or recognition output. Further, if the
involved matchers are non-homogeneous or do not have the same scale, score level
fusion becomes a challenging task. Score fusion normalizes individual scores from
classifiers/ matchers and returns combined score whereas decision fusion returns a
final decision by combining individual decisions from classifiers/ matchers. Hence,
we have chosen score level as well as decision level fusion which would overcome
the limitations of the score as well as decision fusion if a combination of both fusion
mechanism is employed. The notable motives behind this work are to integrate mul-
tiple biometric modalities thereby achieving more discrimination among different
users and producing significant improvement in (i) overall accuracy/ performance,
(ii) Flexibility owing to the absence of individual training (iii) Avoiding spoof at-
tacks. As a multimodal biometric system is able to attain performance improvement
and overcome spoofing attacks, template security schemes aim to protect original
biometric data. The compositions of these two schemes achieve a win-win scenario
for the template protection and performance enhancement. Out of the two mecha-
nisms of template protection named cancelable biometric and biometric cryptosys-
tems, we utilize cancelable transformation instead of biometric cryptosystem since
cryptographic methods reform the template and generate a poor match score. Owing
to the above discussion, we proceed in the direction of hybrid fusion integrating both
score and decision level mechanisms to overcome the limitations related to unibio-
metric, multibiometric, protected multibiometric systems as described above.
In our prior work [9], we have introduced a two-level score fusion scheme which
utilizes the difference between the mean of distributions and scores values to eval-
uate the weight to combine different matchers corresponding to each modality for
the first level. In the next level, the rectangular area is considered for integrating
different modalities. However, the limitations of our earlier work lie in the aspect
of performance and security. Moreover, the prior work does not perform well if non-
homogeneous matchers are present for different modalities in any biometric authenti-
cation system. In a nutshell, we extend this work in the following aspect as compared
to our previous work. In this work, we utilize our previous works [10, 8] to derive can-
celable template for iris and fingerprint. Next, we apply the mean-closure weighting
(MCW) to combine scores from individual matchers corresponding to one particular
biometric modality. Finally, DS theory of evidence is employed to combine the fused
scores achieved from different biometric modalities. For applied intelligence perspec-
tive, DS theory based fusion is utilized to mitigate the uncertainty associated with
non-homogeneous matcher’s output. Further, the proposed hybrid fusion technique
can be efficiently applied for verification decision making in security infrastructure,
defense, governments, and industries. To the best of our knowledge, our method is the
first to incorporate the hybrid fusion for protected multimodal verification utilizing
MCW based score level and DS theory-based decision fusion.
Despite many efforts in the past, existing works suffer from various limitations.
The main contributions of this work are highlighted with respect to the limitations
present in the state-of-the-art:
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1. We have proposed a generic hybrid fusion framework for combining multiple
protected biometric modalities (iris and fingerprint) to aid security and improve
performance.
2. We have chosen score level fusion at the first level to combine scores from homo-
geneous matcher’s scores as well as decision level fusion at the second level to
integrate different modalities which would overcome the limitations of individual
score fusion as well as decision fusion if a combination of both fusion mechanism
is employed.
3. In this work, score fusion is applied directly onto raw scores which contain
richer information than the normalized scores. No normalization is required as
the scores evaluated from different matchers are already obtained in the interval
of [0,1].
4. We perform two-level fusion onto cancelable (protected) scores utilizing mean-
closure and DS theory method to reduce the performance degradation due to can-
celable transformation.
5. Experimental evaluation onto three different virtual databases is carried out to ex-
plore the potential robustness of the proposed method for multimodal biometrics.
Also, we have compared our method with state-of-the-art fusion methodologies.
We have also compared our method with the recent fusion methods including
individual feature, score and decision fusion methods. The experimental results
conclude that our method outperforms over the existing feature, score, decision
and hybrid fusion approaches in the literature.
6. We have computed the performance in two scenarios; (i) performance with fused
scores obtained from cancelable templates (ii) performance with fused scores ob-
tained from unprotected (original) templates. The experimental evaluation con-
firms a minor performance degradation with respect to the unprotected multibio-
metric system. Also, we achieve a significant relative performance improvement
over the unimodal cancelable biometric systems.
7. We have conducted security analysis concerning the required criteria of non-
invertibility, diversity, and revocability using hybrid fusion security model.
8. The proposed hybrid framework has mitigated the uncertainty present in the bio-
metric data and proved to be less complex in comparison to other hybrid fusion
methods.
The rest of this paper has the following structure. In Section 2, existing approaches on
cancelable multibiometric are discussed. Section 3 briefly describes DS-theory of ev-
idence. In Section 4, the proposed method is discussed. Experimental evaluations are
presented in Section 5, and Section 6 discusses the security analysis. The conclusions
are drawn in Section 7.
2 Related works
Utilization of just one biometric modality may result in performance degradation
and security invasion. Hence, multi-biometric authentication systems allowing tem-
plate protection have become a promising solution to address these concerns. Also,
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the utilization of multimodal biometric system would aid to compensate the perfor-
mance drop caused due to cancelable transformation. Therefore, we discuss the ex-
isting works in context to cancelable multimodal biometric systems in this section.
In literature, various methods [27, 3, 26, 2] have been proposed to provide secure
authentication for multi-biometric systems. Paul et al. [27] evaluated the unique fea-
tures from face and ear. After dimension reduction through PCA, they applied random
projection to protect the multi-biometric template. Canuto et al. [3] utilized different
decision fusion methods by applying biohashing, interpolation, and bioconvolving
based protection mechanism over voice and iris biometric. Othman et al. [26] ac-
quired two fingerprint impressions from two different fingers of a user and combined
spiral and the continuous components to create a new protected identity. Camlikaya
et al. [2] incorporated feature level fusion over voice and fingerprint by embedding
the minutiae information into the computed voice features for privacy preservation.
In recent years, Rathgeb et al. [29] proposed Bloom filter based integration scheme to
combine face and iris features. Yang et al. [39] proposed a method to integrate finger-
print and finger-vein features thereby improving recognition accuracy and security.
They evaluated invariant features and concatenated the features after dividing the fea-
tures into blocks. Finally, Partial-DFT is performed on concatenated features to de-
rive multibiometric cancelable template. Chin et al. [5] propose a feature-level fusion
scheme onto fingerprint and palmprint where Gabor filtering is applied to evaluate
features. Next, random tiling is used to derive multimodal protected template based
on a user-specific PIN. Kelkboom et al. [17] applied feature, score and decision level
fusion strategies over helper data. Helper data consists of reliable bits derived from
face database. Next, they utilized AND rule and OR rule for all individual fusion.
Besides cancelable transformation, many researchers [35, 36, 6] also applied fu-
sion schemes over biometric cryptosystem based transformations. Sutcu et al. [35]
evaluated feature string for face and fingerprint biometric and fed it as the input to
a fuzzy commitment framework after concatenating both strings. Talreja et al. [36]
introduced a secure multibiometric framework which evaluates features from face
and iris using a Deep neural network, binarize the features and extract reliable bits.
Next, error-correction is applied to the combined reliable bits, and the hash of the
error-corrected bits is stored as a cancelable template. Cimato et al. [6] introduced an
approach for biometric cryptosystem where secure sketches and fuzzy extractors are
applied over iris and fingerprint. Next, the hash of one modality is utilized to secure
the second modality.
Besides cancelable and cryptosystem based multi-biometric techniques, few re-
cent works are also reported in the literature. Mezai et al. [22] performed score
level fusion utilizing Denoeux model to transform the match scores into belief as-
signments. Finally, DS theory and proportional conflict redistribution (PCR) rules
of combinations are applied to integrate the belief assignments. Nguyen et al. [25]
proposed a score fusion approach where uncertainty mass is computed by a linear
combination of the quality scores and EER of the classifier. Further, min-max nor-
malization is performed followed by DS theory fusion. Kabir et al. [15] proposed
two normalization methods which are overlap extrema based min-max and mean-
to-overlap extrema schemes to normalize the scores. Next, a novel confidence based
weighting is utilized for score integration. Kumar et al. [18] investigated ACO to
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evaluate weights for different biometric modalities taking part in the fusion. The four
fusion rules are considered for combination i.e. sum, product, exp and tanh. Further,
the appropriate weights for these four rules are evaluated for score fusion. Sadhya et
al. [31] considered four soft biometric traits for combination i.e. height, weight, age,
gender. Further, they applied Bayesian classifier with modified conditional probabil-
ity function. Gaussian probability function and log based weighted fusion are used
to achieve better performance. Tao et al. [37] introduced a unique way of hybrid fu-
sion by integrating multiple ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristics) curves. Next,
the overall detection rate for all classifiers is evaluated using AND rule and OR rule.
Thereafter, Grover et al. [12] proposed a hybrid fusion approach where the error rates
are integrated for different threshold points using the PSO algorithm. The error rates
for different threshold values are converted into the fuzzy sets using triangular mem-
bership functions. Further, global fuzzy error rates are computed by utilizing total
distance criterion (TDC).
3 Preliminaries on Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence
Consider, θ be a finite set of all possible hypotheses known as a frame of discernment.
The power set 2θ contains all subsets of θ including a null set (φ) and itself. Each
subset in the power set is referred as a focal element and assigned a value in between
[0, 1] on the basis of their evidence. A value of 1 corresponds to total belief and 0 for
no belief. In general, the assigned value is named as basic belief assignment (BBA).
In DS theory [28], BBA is assigned to each subset i.e. hypothesis also called as the
mass of the individual proposition,
m : 2θ → [0, 1] . (1)
If θ = {A,B} then 2θ = {∅, A,B, θ}. The mass function fulfills the following
criteria: ∑
ai∈2θ
m (Ai) = 1, m (∅) = 0 (2)
where∅ represents the empty set. The measure of belief is defined by the function
bel : 2θ → [0, 1],
bel (A) =
∑
B⊆A,B 6=∅
m (B) . (3)
The bel can also be formally defined as:
belθ,<Y,t [EY,t] (w0 ∈ A) = x (4)
This means the degree of belief x for the classifier Y at time t when w0 ∈ A. Here,
EY,t represents the evidential information known to classifier Y at time t. For ease
in representation, we use bel(A) instead of belθ,<Y,t [EY,t] (w0 ∈ A). Next, plausibility
(pl) is measured as:
pl : 2θ → [0, 1] , pl (A) = 1− bel(¬A) =
∑
B∩A6=∅
m (B) (5)
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If θ defines the set of all possible hypotheses, then the level of uncertainty is
denoted by m (θ). In a hypothesis, beliefs and disbeliefs may not sum to 1 and may
attain 0 value. A value of 0 signifies no evidence present for the hypothesis. The DS
theory based aggregation involves the following steps:
– The measure of belief is evaluated based on the facts from the different sources
of information. As compared to Bayesian theory, the masses are not distributed
among classes.
– Dempster rule of combination is applied to aggregate belief measure obtained
from the available information and facts.
For different sources, (1, 2, · · · , N), Dempster’s rule of combination is described
in Eq. (6):
m1,2,··· ,N (A) =
∑
Bi∩···∩Bk=Am1 (Bi) · · · · ·mN (Bk)
1−K (6)
where A,B1, . . . , BN ⊆ θ, and
K =
∑
Bi∩···∩Bk=∅
m1 (Bi) ·m2 (Bj) . . .mN (Bk) (7)
where K denotes the conflict present between evidences; 1-K is the normalization
factor.
3.1 Updation of masses
In a majority of the scenarios, mass updation is required if any new evidence or
belief is encountered. Suppose, E ⊂ θ and Ed be the evidence not present in E. If
this new evidence provides the exact value of Ed, then bel(A) is updated based on the
following condition rule:
bel[Ed](A) = bel(A ∪ ¬E)− bel(¬E) (8)
After the computation of the masses, the classification is performed onto the training
set. One of the aggregation rules is applied to evaluate total conflicting mass. Next,
the winner-take-all assignment is utilized to compute A(k), which is defined in Eq.
(9):
m (Ak) = maxAjm (Aj) , j = 1, . . .M + 1 (9)
where M +1 represents is the total number of classes including the class of rejection
and AM+1 = θ.
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Fig. 1: Block diagram of the proposed fusion framework
4 Proposed method
In this section, we describe our method to derive a hybrid fusion mechanism for
cancelable multimodal biometric verification. The block diagram of the proposed
fusion framework is illustrated in Fig. 1.
The block diagram comprises three major blocks i.e. score computation, hybrid
fusion, and verification. Score computation evaluates score from the different match-
ers applied on the protected iris and protected fingerprint templates. Hybrid fusion
module includes score level followed by decision level fusion schemes. Score fu-
sion is carried out using MCW to combine different matchers corresponding to each
biometric modality whereas decision fusion integrates the decision outcome of indi-
vidual modality. A final decision is made using the fusion rules for authenticating a
user. Finally, verification is performed using a pre-defined threshold to classify user
either a genuine or an imposter.
4.1 Score computation
In this subsection, we present different matchers applied on the protected templates
to compute match scores. Score computation represents either dissimilarity (distance)
or similarity measure. Therefore, it is needed to convert all the scores alike. In this
work, we transform all the scores into similarity measure following the common stan-
dard. The comparison between cancelable enrolled and cancelable query template is
performed to evaluate match scores for iris and fingerprint biometric. To derive can-
celable templates for iris and fingerprint, we apply the similar methodology proposed
in our earlier work [10, 8]. For reader’s clarity, we briefly describe the template gen-
eration methods for both modalities.
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4.1.1 Cancelable iris score computation
To derive cancelable iris template, iris images are pre-processed using Masek’s [21]
and Daugman’s [7] techniques. Next, IrisCode features are extracted in the form
of a 0-1 matrix using 1-D Log-Gabor filter [21] with phase quantization from the
pre-processed iris images. Thereafter, rotation-invariant IrisCode is generated from
the original IrisCodes, and the rotation invariant IrisCode is transformed into a row
vector. Next, the decimal vector is derived by partitioned the row vector into fixed
size blocks. Finally, a Look-up table is created to map the decimal-encoded vector
and check bits are selected to generate the cancelable template. Comparison between
protected enrolled and protected query iris template is performed in the transformed
domain to measure the match score. First, we compute the similarity in Hamming
domain for its simplicity in the evaluation. Hamming distance is the sum of non-
equivalent bits (exclusive-OR) between stored and query templates. The Hamming
similarity (Hs) is computed by subtracting normalized Hamming distance by one, as
defined in Eq. (10):
Hs = 1− 1
N
N∑
i
Ei ⊕Qi (10)
where, Qi and Ei are the ith bits of the query and enrolled templates, respectively. N
is the total number of bits in the template.
Next, Jaccard similarity is evaluated between the protected enrolled and protected
query iris template. It measures the overlapping bits in E and Q except 0-0 overlap
as defined in Eq. (11). It is computed to elude the ill match condition (0-0 match)
between the protected query and protected enrolled templates.
Js =
N11
N01 +N10 +N11
(11)
where,
N11: Number of positions where E and Q both have a value of 1,
N01: Number of positions where the value in E is 0 and the Value in Q is 1,
N10: Number of positions where the value in E is 1 and the Value in Q is 0.
4.1.2 Cancelable fingerprint score computation
To derive cancelable fingerprint template, the input fingerprint image is preprocessed
to obtain the thinned image and to extract the minutiae information. Next, we form
a nearest-neighbor structure around each minutiae point using the ridge-based co-
ordinate system and compute the ridge features from the thinned image and minutiae
information. Thereafter, we apply cantor pairing function to encode the ridge fea-
tures uniquely. Finally, the random projection is applied to the paired output to derive
the protected template. In the verification stage, the same procedure is followed to
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generate the protected template from the query fingerprint. Cancelable enrolled, and
cancelable query fingerprint templates are compared to calculate match scores for fin-
gerprint biometric. The matching is performed in the transformed domain to maintain
secrecy. We adopt the inner product based similarity measures since similarity com-
putation requires measuring the likelihood between the rows in the protected enrolled
template (E) to the rows in protected query templates (Q). First, we utilize Dice co-
efficient to measure the local similarity (Ls dice) between each row of enrolled and
that of query templates as utilized in [38] as defined in Eq. (12):
Ls dice (i, j ) =
2E(i, :) ·Q(j, :)
||E(i, :) ||2 + ||Q(j, :) ||2 (12)
Further, we apply cosine similarity (Ls cos) between each row of the enrolled
and that of query templates to compute normalized dot product as defined here:
Ls cos (i, j ) =
E(i, :) ·Q(j, :)√ ||E(i, :) ||2√ ||Q(j, :) ||2 (13)
Next, we re-evaluate each element in local similarity matrix to avoid double
matching. For this purpose, we acquire those positions where the maximum scores
in E(i, :), and Q(j, :) coincides to obtain filtered similarity matrix. Next, the global
similarity score is obtained by summing up the entries in filtered matrix and dividing
by a minimum of the minutiae points in E and Q. Finally, the likelihood of the en-
rolled and query template being the two fingerprint of the same subject is measured
to compute global similarity scores.
4.2 Hybrid score and decision level fusion
After, evaluation of match scores from cancelable modalities, there is a need for score
normalization such that match scores are transformed into a common interval (e.g.,
in the interval of [0,1]). In this work, normalization is not required since the methods
utilized in score computation generate the scores in the interval of [0,1]. However,
the proposed work can be extended to the situations where the scores from different
biometric modalities follow different distribution range or scores derived from dif-
ferent matchers may have a different range instead of [0,1]. In these situations, we
utilize the RHE normalization [13] to guarantee a meaningful score integration since
it is found to be sensitive to outliers. RHE minimizes the score-sets to be normalized
since raw scores have richer information content than the normalized score. In the
following, we have utilized the mean-closure (MC) weighting scheme for optimal
weight estimation. The proposed model achieves the optimal weights for different
matchers corresponding to each of the regions present in the FMR/FNMR curve in-
cluding the uncertainty region. Further, the fused match scores is then fed to DS the-
ory based decision fusion to integrate different modalities. In this work, we evaluate
the scores from protected iris and protected fingerprint biometric to explore the po-
tential significance of cancelable multimodal biometrics concerning security, privacy
and performance improvement over the unimodal biometric system.
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Fig. 2: Explanatory diagram Region of uncertainty present in FMR/FNMR curve;
FMRZero, FNMRZero andEER correspond to matcher 1 i.e. Hamming similarity
4.2.1 Mean-closure (MC) based weighting
Let us consider, Hamming similarity and Jaccard similarity measure to be matcher
1 and matcher 2, respectively where the scores from two matchers (sh, sj) are to be
integrated. On the basis of Fig. 2, we indicate five possible regions for the different
scores of any matcher. The regions (i.e., R1 and R2) represents the region of con-
fidence where both the regions are able to classify the scores accurately. Region 3
(R3), region 4 (R4) and region 5 (R5) falls into the uncertainty where it is very diffi-
cult to classify the match score. Therefore, it is necessary to assign more weight to the
scores lying into the confidence region (i.e., R1 and R2) and relatively less weight to
the scores in the region of uncertainty while evaluating the fused score. In this work,
we estimate the weights based on the mean-closure metric which measures the sep-
aration of scores from the mean of the matcher’s genuine and imposter distribution
for different users. The ratio of these two decides whether the user’s score is close
to genuine or imposter distribution of matcher 1 or matcher 2. We represent these
notations as (i,m) for every pair of user and matcher. The mean-closure (Mcmi ) for
a of user-matcher pair (i,m) in a multibiometric system is defined as in Eq. (14):
Mcmi =
(
µmi (gen)− sm
µmi (imp)− sm
)2
(14)
where, µmi (gen) and µ
m
i (imp) represents the mean of genuine distribution and mean
of imposter distribution, respectively. Further, the estimated weight for each matcher
using MC weighting is computed as follows:
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wmi =
mcmi∑M
i=1mc
m
i
(15)
where, wmi is the weight for matcher m and M is the number of matchers for a
particular modality. 0 ≤ wmi ≤ 1, ∀i, ∀m, and
∑M
m=1 w
m
i = 1,∀i.
Here, the weights are proportional to the corresponding mean-closure i.e., the
more accurate matcher attains higher weights than those of less accurate matcher for
user i. This user-specific score weighting scheme deals optimal with the scores lying
in the region of uncertainty. Applying the weights, we achieve fused scores from
different matchers of a particular modality.
4.2.2 Fusion using DS-theory of evidence
In the proposed fusion framework, DS theory [32, 34] is applied to combine the
matcher’s decision of individual biometric modalities. For each input image, the
matchers assign either a label accept i.e., 1 to the hypothesis i, i ∈ θ or reject i.e.,
0. Hence, there are two focal elements for each matcher i and ¬i = θ − i, where
i is for confirming the hypothesis and ¬i is for rejecting a particular hypothesis for
mass assignment as shown in Table 1. We compute the corresponding predictive rates
for every matcher, which are then used to assign their BBA. The predictive rate of a
matcher Pk for an output class k is the ratio of the number of users classified correctly
to the total number of users classified as class k.
Table 1: Basic belief assignment function
Matchers Basic belief assignments (BBA)Class: Accept
(Gen)
Class: Reject
(Imp)
Matcher 1 m1(Gen) m1(Imp)
Matcher 2 m2(Gen) m2(Imp)
After applying the MCW method to combine score from the different matchers
for a particular modality, we utilize DS theory of evidence to integrate the scores from
different modality to obtain the overall score/decision. For this purpose, we evaluate
decision induced scores from the fused score and apply DS theory framework to ob-
tain a final decision output. In the proposed method, when the jth matcher classifies
the result k ∈ (c + 1) for the match score Sj , it is denoted that for all instances the
likelihood of k being the correct class is Pk and the likelihood of k not being the
actual class is (1-Pk). The induced score/decision output is computed by multiplying
Pkj with the respective match score Sj for the jthmatcher. This score is then utilized
as basic belief assignment or mass mj(k) as defined in Eq. (16):
mj (k) = Pkj · Sj (16)
where j= 1,2 corresponds to the two matchers; one for the output achieved through
integrating two different matchers for protected iris modality and the other for the out-
put obtained by integrating both of the matchers over protected fingerprint templates.
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In a similar way, mj (¬k); with m (θ) = 1 indicates the measure of disbelief. After
the evaluation of induced score, the mass of each evidence or classifier is combined
iteratively as described in Eq. (17):
mfinal = m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 ⊕m4 (17)
where⊕ represents the Dempster rule of combination. Here, we need not have to deal
with the computation cost associated with DS theory [32] since verification involves
only two classes (accept, reject).
4.3 Verification
The utmost decision output is attained by employing a threshold (t) to mfinal as
defined in Eq.(18). In this way, a user’s identity can be verified to be a genuine or an
imposter.
Result =
{
Accept; if mfinal > t
Reject; otherwise
(18)
5 Experimental results and analysis
To perform successful multimodal verification, we present a number of experiments
to demonstrate the performance of our proposed hybrid fusion framework encom-
passing score and decision level fusion. Subsection 5.1 describes the databases uti-
lized in our work for experimentation. Subsection 5.2 narrates the experimental set-
tings and performance metrics to quantify the results for each database. The perfor-
mance of the proposed method is evaluated in Subsection 5.3. Subsection 5.4 presents
baseline comparison to compare the performance of the method under the protected
and unprotected scenario. Subsection 5.5 validates the achieved performance statis-
tically. Next, we compare the proposed methodology with the other approaches in
order to specifically measure the effectiveness and robustness of the proposed ap-
proach in Subsection 5.6. In section 6, we perform security analysis for our method
and discuss the three major requirements needed for template protection as described
in Section 1.
5.1 Database
We evaluate the performance of our method onto three virtual databases involving
iris and fingerprint modalities. The virtual databases are created due to the underly-
ing cost and efforts related to multimodal database acquisition. Virtual databases are
constructed by pairing a user from one modality with a user from another modality.
This pairing assumes that biometric traits of a user are independent. For iris, we use
the CASIA V-3-Interval [4] database maintained by the Chinese Academy of Science
and Multimedia university database (MMU1) [23]. The CASIA V-3-Interval database
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contains 2639 high-quality iris images from 249 users collected in two different ses-
sions while MMU1 comprises of left and right iris images for 46 users. Considering
left iris and right iris as different subjects, we find that there are 117 left and 121 right
iris subjects from 348 total subjects from 249 users of CASIA V-3-Interval which
contain at least 7 samples per subject. In MMU1 database, we consider a dataset of
92 users with 5 iris samples assuming left and right iris as a different subject. For the
fingerprint modality, we use datasets DB1, DB2 of FVC2002 [11] database contain-
ing a total of 800 images of 100 subjects with eight samples each.
– First virtual database (Virtual A): Comprises of 100 subjects where iris images
are randomly selected from 121 right iris subjects of CASIA V-3 Interval and
fingerprint from FVC2002DB1 with 7 samples per subject.
– Second virtual database (Virtual B): Comprises of 92 subjects where iris images
are selected from MultiMedia university version-1 (MMU1) database [23] and
fingerprint from FVC2002DB2 [11] with 5 samples per subject.
– Third virtual database (Virtual C): Comprises of 100 subjects chosen from 117
left iris subjects of CASIA V-3 Interval and FVC2002DB2 with 7 samples per
user.
5.2 Experimental settings
After the generation of the protected template for iris and fingerprint, enrolled
and query templates are compared to derive intra-class (i.e., genuine) scores and
inter-class (i.e., imposter) scores. We adopt the FVC protocol to obtain the match
scores. In FVC protocol [11], the first sample of a subject is compared with all
remaining samples of the same subject to obtain genuine scores whereas the first
sample of a subject is compared with the first sample of remaining subjects to
measure imposter scores. First, the match scores from iris and fingerprint from
different matchers are integrated by applying the proposed MC weighting method.
As a result, the fused iris and fused fingerprint scores are obtained. Next, we evaluate
induced score (decision output) from the computed match scores. Finally, we apply
the DS theory of evidence to combined induced scores. The final decision output
is compared with a predefined threshold to verify the user’s identity. Further, the
performance of our method is evaluated using the following metrics:
FMR: The probability of getting a positive comparison decision for an imposter
FNMR: The probability of getting a negative comparison decision for a genuine user
GMR: Can be measured as 1-FNMR
EER: The error rate where FMR and FNMR hold equality
Note that the focus of this work is the hybrid fusion (score and decision level) fusion
for cancelable multimodal biometric, details of cancelable template generation is not
reviewed here.
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Fig. 3: First and second row indicate sample images from CASIA V-3.0 Interval and
MMU1 database; Third and fourth row show the example images from FVC2002DB1
and FVC2002DB2, respectively.
5.3 Performance evaluation
The larger context of this work is the hybrid fusion over the three described virtual
multimodal databases for verification. The example images of the two modalities for
Virtual A, Virtual B, and Virtual C databases are shown in Fig. 3.
After the generation of the protected templates for iris and fingerprint, stored pro-
tected and query protected template are compared with each other to calculate match
scores. For iris modality, the match scores are derived using two matchers i.e., Ham-
ming and Jaccard similarity whereas Dice and Cosine similarities are computed from
fingerprint modality. To carry out the experimental evaluation, we perform training
onto one set of each database. For each experiment, half of the total subjects are con-
sidered to train fusion retaining another half to test the performance of the proposed
fusion framework. Further, we evaluate the match scores from the trained subjects. As
a result, there are 1050 genuine scores and 1225 imposter scores for Virtual A and
Virtual C multimodal chimerical database whereas we achieve 460 genuine scores
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and 1035 imposter score for Virtual B database respectively. The remaining half sub-
jects are utilized for evaluation which results in the same number of genuine and
imposter comparisons as mentioned before. Score level fusion is performed to fuse
the match scores computed from different matchers corresponding to one modality.
There is no parameter learning required for score fusion since we apply novel trans-
formation based method (i.e., MCW) onto match scores. Next, we apply DS theory
based fusion to combine integrated match scores corresponding to each modality. For
each experiment, the training set is required first to find the parameters for decision
fusion. In decision-level fusion, the parameters refer to the masses of the respective
hypothesis. The masses have been computed for each induced score/decision out-
put from different modality. These computed masses are combined using Eq. (6).
Final verification decision is obtained by comparing the combined output with a pre-
defined threshold (see Eq. 18). In DS theory based fusion, it is necessary to update
the BBA if any new evidence or information is encountered. This updation is carried
out using Eq. (8). Next, the evaluation is performed on test datasets for each vir-
tual database. We evaluate EER values and Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
curves for unimodal and multimodal databases. Further, the performance in term of
GMR @ 0.01% FMR is computed since a biometric system deployed in a security
application is considered to be efficient if it has low EER and high GMR at low FMR
[28].
The multimodal biometric performance of Virtual A is evaluated utilizing the
scores obtained from CASIA V-3 Interval and FVC2002DB1. First, the performance
for individual modalities (i.e., iris and fingerprint) taking part in fusion is evaluated.
Next, we evaluate the performance of the multimodal biometric system. The ROC
curve for the Virtual A multimodal database is shown in Fig. 4 which demonstrate
the performance for the scores obtained in the unprotected and protected domain.
From Fig. 4, it has been observed that the performance of the multibiometric system
is better than that of a unimodal biometric system utilizing the proposed approach for
both domains.
In a similar manner, the Virtual B database comprising MMU1 iris and
FVC2002DB1 is tested against our method. Figure 5 illustrates the ROC curve for
the Virtual B database. We also demonstrate the ROC curves for individual modali-
ties comprising Virtual B which clearly shows the superior performance for both of
the scenarios.
Further, the performance for the Virtual C database comprising CASIA V-3 In-
terval iris and FVC2002DB2 is evaluated. The ROC curves for individual modality
along with unprotected multimodal is shown in Fig. 6. It can be noticed from Fig.
6 that the proposed multibiometric system achieves better performance over the uni-
modal and unprotected multibiometric system for decisions obtained through original
and cancelable biometric systems.
In the proposed method, the performance is degraded by 0.32%, 0.60% and 0.28%
for Virtual A, Virtual B and Virtual C datasets, respectively under protected scenario
as evident from the Fig. 4, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6. Therefore, we conclude that performance
degradation produced by the cancelable transformation is very low. Further, we also
evaluate the performance of our method in terms of GMR @ 0.01% FMR and results
are reported in Table 3 for Virtual A, Virtual B, and Virtual C databases, respectively.
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Virtual_A EER=0.55
FVC2002DB1 EER=1.63
CASIA V−3 Interval (right iris) EER=0.84
Virtual_A EER=0.37
FVC2002DB1 EER=1.39
CASIA V−3 Interval (right iris) EER=0.78
Fig. 4: ROC curves for Virtual A database
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Virtual_B EER=0.05
MMU1 EER= 0.42
FVC2002DB2 EER=0.89
Virtual_B EER=0.13
FVC2002DB2 EER=0.98
MMU1 EER= 0.47
Fig. 5: ROC curves for Virtual B database
From Table 3, it is evident that the performance of the multibiometric system using
the proposed method is better than that of other existing fusion schemes. The perfor-
mance for the Virtual B database is higher than that of Virtual A and Virtual C since
there is a relative minimal overlap between the genuine and imposter score distribu-
tions. The extent of overlap is evaluated by decidability index d′, which is defined
as:
d′ =
|µ1 − µ2|√
σ21+σ
2
2
2
(19)
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Virtual_C EER=0.36
CASIA V−3 Interval (Left iris) EER=0.73
FVC2002DB2 EER=0.89
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Virtual_C EER=0.50
CASIA V−3 Interval (Left iris) EER=0.81
FVC2002DB2 EER=0.98
Fig. 6: ROC curves for Virtual C database
where, µ1 and µ2 represent the genuine mean and imposter mean distributions,
respectively; and the variances of the genuine and imposter score distributions are
represented by σ1 and σ2 respectively. The value of d′ should be higher if the gen-
uine and imposter distributions are more separable. We achieve the d′ of 2.74, 3.01
and 2.81 for Virtual A, Virtual B, and Virtual C databases respectively. The score
distributions for all three chimerical databases are shown in Fig. 7. From Fig. 7, it
is evident that the proposed fusion scheme achieves the optimal separation between
genuine and imposter distribution for both the virtual databases.
5.4 Baseline comparison
Baseline comparison refers the comparison between the verification performance be-
tween protected multimodal and unprotected multimodal biometric system. In this
work, we evaluate the performance obtained by combined scores from different
modalities (fused iris and fused fingerprint) and final decision output under protected
and unprotected scenarios. Further, we compare the performance of the proposed
hybrid fusion framework with respect to the above-mentioned verification systems.
Figure 8 represents the performance achieved in different scenarios for Virtual A,
Virtual B, and Virtual C databases. Each of the figure comprise of (i) performances
obtained by applying MCW over match scores from different matchers correspond-
ing iris i.e. Score fusion [Protected iris], Score fusion [unprotected iris], Score fusion
[Protected fingerprint], Score fusion [unprotected fingerprint], (ii) Hybrid fusion ap-
plied over iris and fingerprint modalities i.e. Hybrid fusion [Protected] and Hybrid
fusion [Unprotected].
Figure 8 illustrates that hybrid fusion framework obtains 0.37 and 0.55 of EER
under unprotected and protected scenario which is superior in comparison to fused
iris unprotected (0.59), fused fingerprint unprotected (1.10), fused iris protected
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Fig. 7: Distribution curves of the fused matching scores
(0.67) and fused fingerprint unprotected (1.23) for the Virtual A databases. For the
Virtual B database, the proposed method achieves an EER of 0.05 and 0.13 under
unprotected and protected scenario which performs better than the results obtained in
fused iris unprotected (0.23), fused iris unprotected (0.69), fused iris protected (0.31)
and fused iris protected (0.77) verification systems. Similarly, we obtain superior re-
sults for Virtual C database also. Hence, it has been confirmed that hybrid fusion
framework outperforms over individual score fusion systems for all three databases.
5.5 Statistical evaluation of proposed hybrid fusion method
The performance of any biometric system is affected by the size of the database and
the images comprising the database. ROC curves and verification performance are
not enough to validate the overall performance of the multibiometric system. Hence,
Bengio et al. [1] presented a statistical test which utilizes half total error rate (HTER)
and confidence interval (CI). Here, we test our method against these two parameters.
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Fig. 8: Baseline comparison for the three databases
HTER is computed as:
HTER =
FMR+ FNMR
2
In order to compute CI around HTER, we look for the bound σ × zα/2. Here, σ
and zα/2 are defined as [1]:
σ =
√
FMR (1− FMR)
4 ·NI +
FNMR (1− FNMR)
4 ·NG
zα/2 =
1.645 for 90% CI1.960 for 95% CI
2.576 for 99% CI
where, NG and NI represents the total number of intra-class comparisons and
the total number of inter-class comparisons, respectively. We evaluate HTER and CI
for both of the chimerical databases using the FMR and FNMR. The statistical eval-
uation is carried out at 0.01% FMR and results are reported in Table 2. From Table
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2, it has been observed that HTER lies between 0.02± 0.05 with 95% confidence for
the three chimerical databases which validates the achieved performance from our
method.
Table 2: Confidence interval around HTER of the proposed hybrid fusion method
Database HTER (%)
Confidence Interval (%)
around HTER for
90% 95% 99%
Virtual A 0.54 0.02 0.033 0.043
Virtual B 0.14 0.04 0.039 0.048
Virtual C 0.52 0.03 0.042 0.050
5.6 Comparison with other state-of-the-art fusion techniques
To validate the performance of our method, we compare our proposed hybrid fusion
scheme with other recent methodologies in literature. Besides hybrid fusion meth-
ods [12, 37], we include few other recent state-of-the-art fusion approaches based
on score level [25, 18, 15, 22, 9] and decision level fusion [31, 17]. As described in
performance evaluation, it can be observed that the proposed method performs opti-
mally than the other approaches with respect to EER (see Figure 4-6). The superior
performance is due to the extent of overlap (d
′
) i.e. separability between the genuine
and imposter distributions, as shown in Fig. 7. This also proves that the proposed
method is less sensitive to the outliers since the separability between distributions is
significantly higher than the existing methods.
First, the proposed hybrid fusion method is compared with other existing hybrid
decision fusion schemes proposed in [12, 37]. In case of Virtual A database, the tech-
nique proposed in [12] performs better than the proposed method, but it involves com-
plex evaluation for global error optimization using PSO. The decision fusion methods
involve AND rule and OR rule-based fusion proposed by Kelkboom et al. [17] and
Bayesian classifier fusion proposed by Sadhya et al. [31]. Table 3 reports the EER
and GMR @ 0.01% FMR, obtained using the proposed and existing weighting tech-
niques. From the reported results in Table 3, it has been observed that the performance
of AND rule and OR rule combination methods gets degraded in case the individual
classifiers does not perform well. Hence, these two methods are rarely recommended
in practice. Additionally, it can be analyzed from Table 3 that the proposed hybrid fu-
sion outperforms the individual score level methods [25, 18, 15, 22, 9]. The proposed
hybrid multi-biometric system (i.e., cancelable iris - cancelable fingerprint system),
provides lower EER and higher GMRs @ 0.01% FMR than a majority of the existing
techniques. Also, the best performance in terms of EER (i.e. 0.55, 0.13 and 0.50) and
GMR @ 0.01% FMR (i.e. 99.29%, 99.70% and 99.33%) are achieved using the pro-
posed method for the three virtual multimodal databases. Also, it is confirmed that the
performance is enhanced by (48%,66%), (72%,86%) and (49%,38%) over unimodal
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cancelable systems for Virtual A (iris, fingerprint), Virtual B (iris, fingerprint), and
Virtual C (iris, fingerprint) databases, respectively.
Table 3: Performance comparison of the proposed method with existing fusion ap-
proaches (in %)
Methods
Performance ( EER,GMR @0.01%)
Virtual A Virtual B Virtual C
unprotected protected unprotected protected unprotected protected
Score level fusion methods
Dwivedi et al. [9] 0.49, 99.59 0.69,98.89 0.09, 99.97 0.17, 99.64 0.45, 99.49 0.61, 99.25
Kabir et al. [15] 0.47, 99.44 0.62, 98.73 0.11, 99.80 0.17, 99.59 0.59, 99.12 0.71, 98.50
Nguyen et al. [25] 0.84, 98.81 1.12, 98.63 0.37, 99.49 0.45, 99.29 0.62, 99.28 0.79, 98.97
Kumar et al. [18] 0.69, 99.18 0.78, 98.91 0.29, 99.58 0.41, 99.34 0.65, 99.30 0.83, 98.81
Mezai et al. [22] 0.95, 98.85 1.19, 98.71 0.87, 98.99 1.10, 98.79 0.73, 99.18 0.89, 99.09
Decision level fusion methods
Kelkboom et al. [17] 1.52, 98.39 1.72, 98.13 0.97, 98.93 1.28, 98.70 0.78, 99.10 0.95, 98.91
Kelkboom et al. [17] 1.41, 98.51 1.62, 98.32 0.81, 99.02 1.04, 98.83 0.69, 99.21 0.85, 99.01
Sadhya et al. [31] 1.01, 98.87 1.23, 98.70 0.55, 99.35 0.64, 99.23 0. 53, 99.38 0.67, 99.19
Hybrid fusion methods
Grover et al. [12] 0.34, 99.55 0.52, 99.39 0.09, 99.90 0.15, 99.81 0.42, 99.36 0.60, 99.27
Tao et al. [37] 0.52, 99.32 0.68, 99.07 0.19, 99.76 0.27, 99.61 0.51, 99.41 0.68, 99.24
Proposed fusion 0.37, 99.64 0.55, 99.29 0.05, 99.98 0.13, 99.70 0.36, 99.55 0.50, 99.33
6 Security analysis
In this section, we present a general security model with all the components to per-
form exhaustive security analysis. For reader’s clarity, we also describe each assump-
tion taken into account for the entities associated with the verification procedure pro-
viding a more general perspective of how the multimodal fusion framework deals
with different threats or privacy invasion attempts. An explanatory diagram (see Fig.
9 (left)) illustrates the verification procedure adopted for an unprotected scenario for
two entities:
Client: The client performs data acquisition, feature extraction and represents the
features in the form of verifiable templates. Next, it computes the similarity score
between the query and stored template. Finally, user’s identity is verified based on a
predefined threshold.
Server: The server maintains the true biometric template for each user present in the
database and shares these templates with the client for verification. To strengthen
the privacy of a user, the server must send client’s biometric data without pulling
any other information and protect the biometric information stored in the database
simultaneously.
In contrast, a different security model is utilized for verifying protected biomet-
ric template is shown in Fig. 9 (right). In the protected scenario, all the biometric
information which is either stored or communicated between client and server are
transformed (i.e., protected). Hence, the mentioned entities play the following roles:
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Fig. 9: Unprotected vs. protected biometric verification
Client: The client first acquires the data and extracts the features. Next, it applies a
cancelable transformation to derive protected biometric templates and stores it onto
DB server.
DB server: It contains the database consisting of only protected templates and shares
these templates with the client for verification.
Authentication server: It comprises the user-specific key and comparator. Also, it
computes the final verification decision by comparing stored and query template.
The following assumptions are taken into account to perform secure authentica-
tion in a multi-biometric framework:
– An imposter may get access to any one of the server but the DB server and au-
thentication server would not intrigue.
– The client does not know the user-specific key hence it can neither extract the
original template from the protected one nor the similarity score obtained through
protected modalities assuming that the client serves honestly. As a result, there is
no invasion possible of biometric information in the communication link.
– Similarly, the authentication server would not be allowed to access to either the
original or stored protected template avoiding any trace or instigate biometric
data. Also, it is assumed that all involved entities adopt the protocol and thus the
score evaluated by the clients are correct.
Based on the security model illustrated in Fig. 10, the secure and privacy-
preserving authentication in a multi-biometric fusion framework should exhibit the
following requirements:
1. The client alone should have access to the original biometric template
2. Only the protected template should be stored in the DB server and cannot be
visible to any other entity
3. The match score/ decision output cannot be transmitted as it may be utilized to
launch inversion/ hill climbing attacks.
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Fig. 10: Security model: Hybrid fusion
To ensure the privacy protection, the authentication system should fulfill the three
requirements, i.e. non-invertibility, diversity and revocability as described in Section
1.1. We will investigate these three criteria in the following subsections.
6.1 Non-invertibility
In our multimodal biometric fusion framework, only the protected template is shared/
communicated between DB server and client to compute the match scores/ decision
outputs. Moreover, only the user-specific key is known to the authentication server.
The authentication server can never get access to the stored and query protected tem-
plate. Further, the client is not allowed to send any information to the extracted origi-
nal template. Hence, it would be impossible for the client or any of the servers to trace
any information related to template information since decisional composite residuos-
ity in an NP-hard problem. Therefore, we can conclude that our approach meets the
requirement of non-invertibility based on the ISO/IEC 24745 standard [33].
6.2 Diversity
In our approach, either a look-up table or random projection matrix or both of these
can be altered to derive the numerous protected template corresponding to an instance
of any subject. This ensures the criteria of diversity.
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6.3 Revocability
To ensure potent revocability, the user-specific key can be altered to derive a new
protected template and stored in the DB server. This way, the whole database could
be re-secured with retransformed templates. This would avoid the impersonation of
different users. These transformed templates for same or different subjects would
be uncorrelated from each other. No information could be retrieved from these un-
correlated templates since the scores/ decision outputs from different modalities are
computed in the protected domain.
In the proposed scheme, only the server is allowed to access the protected scores/
decision outputs from different modalities. Hence, inversion attack and Hill-climbing
attacks [20] are impossible to launch for an attacker, since he/she would not get the
desired feedback to reconstruct the original template.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a novel hybrid fusion scheme for protected multi-
biometric template verification based on score and decision level combination. Fu-
sion at decision level is performed using DS theory of evidence and MCW weight-
ing is employed to combine scores from different matchers corresponding to each
modality. MCW weighting does not involve any learning incurring minimal com-
putation complexity and DS theory exhibit a signification performance improvement
thereby avoiding the uncertainty present in the matchers making ie efficiently applica-
ble in military and government’s security applications. Fusing the output of different
matchers at the score or decision level allows the freedom to choose and evaluate
any feature extraction or matching algorithm. In our method, score normalization
is not required at any stage since the utilized matchers provide the scores already
in the range [0,1]. In theory, the experimental evaluation carried out over three vir-
tual databases depicts that the proposed fusion method will always outperform over
the unibiometric authentication, and in practice, it also attain performance improve-
ment better than the existing hybrid fusion and other conventional fusion schemes
for multibiometric verification. Also, the performance evaluation showed that verifi-
cation could be carried out in the transformed domain with no degradation. Further,
the security analysis of our work ensures that our approach fulfills the desired char-
acteristics of non-invertibility and revocability for template protection schemes by
preserving the recognition accuracy. It is hoped that the proposed approach would be
tested onto large databases containing 1000 subjects with more than two modalities.
Additionally, we are also focusing on sequential and parallel decision level fusion for
protected and unprotected multimodal biometric systems in future.
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